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The “Weaponization” of Corpus Linguistics: 
Testing Heller’s Linguistic Claims 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In its controversial landmark decision of District of Columbia v. 
Heller,1 the United States Supreme Court ruled that the Second 
Amendment of the United States Constitution protects an individual 
right to carry operational firearms in the home for the purpose of self-
defense.2 To do so, the Court relied on the assumption that the right 
to bear arms was originally understood to encompass the actual carry-
ing of personal weapons (in case of confrontation).3 But the Court 
acknowledged that at the time of the Founding, the phrase bear arms 
also had “an idiomatic meaning that was significantly different than its 
natural meaning: ‘to serve as a soldier, do military service, fight,’ or ‘to 
wage war.’”4 Justice John Paul Stevens adopted this so-called idiomatic 
sense of bear arms in his dissent, and concluded that the Second 
Amendment protects the narrower right of the people to maintain 
well-regulated state militias.5 
This Note introduces new corpus linguistics research that suggests 
both Justice Antonin Scalia’s majority opinion and Justice Stevens’s 
dissenting opinion relied on inaccurate historical linguistic claims. 
First, this Note finds that contrary to Justice Stevens’s assertion, 
there is currently no evidence to support the claim that keep and bear 
arms was a legal term of art or that the Second Amendment established 
a “unitary right.” Rather, it is more likely that the Second Amendment 
protects both a right of the people to “keep arms” and a separate right 
of the people to “bear arms.” 
Second, because most corpus linguistics scholars that have ana-
lyzed the Second Amendment have focused on whether bear arms was 
 
 1.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 2.  Id. at 635. 
 3.  Id. at 584, 589. 
 4.  Id. at 586. 
 5.  Id. at 637 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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used more often in “military” or “collective” contexts than “individual” 
contexts, most of the available evidence has been skewed in favor of 
the conclusion that the Amendment protects a more limited collective 
militia right rather than a more expansive individual right. By contrast, 
this Note focuses on dividing the recorded uses of bear arms into the 
two camps delineated by the Court: the more literal “carrying” sense 
(what Justice Scalia referred to as the “natural” sense) and the special-
ized military sense (what both the majority and dissenting opinions re-
ferred to as the “idiomatic” sense). While this Note’s results finding 
that the phrase bear arms was recorded more often in its specialized 
sense than its carrying sense in the latter half of the eighteenth century 
arguably still support the conclusions of this past research, they also 
suggest that the Heller Court’s individual rights interpretation of the 
Amendment is more defensible than these researchers have suggested. 
Specifically, this Note’s research shows that the carrying sense of bear 
arms made up approximately one-fifth to two-fifths of recorded uses 
of the term in Founding Era American texts.6 
Third and finally, this Note confirms that it is emphatically not 
true that bear arms bore its specialized sense (“idiomatic meaning”) in 
the Founding Era only when followed by the preposition against. 
Part I discusses popular theories of the Second Amendment and 
explains which reading the U.S. Supreme Court adopted in District of 
Columbia v. Heller. Part II explains how original ordinary meaning is 
important to the Court’s continued interpretation of the Amendment 
and how corpus linguistics can help scholars and judges uncover that 
original ordinary meaning. Part III describes recent corpus linguistics 
research on the Second Amendment. Part IV identifies a few of Hel-
ler’s linguistic claims and explains how this Note used corpus linguis-
tics to test those claims. Part V discusses the results of those tests. Part 
VI acknowledges the limits of this Note’s conclusions and suggests ar-
eas for future research. The Note then concludes. 
 
 6.  The searches for this Note were conducted near the end of 2018. For details on which 
texts were considered, see Part II.D. 
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II.  RULES OF ENGAGEMENT: COMPETING THEORIES OF THE 
SECOND AMENDMENT 
A. The Collective Rights, Individual Rights, and Insurrectionist 
Theories of the Second Amendment 
The Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that, 
“[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free 
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be in-
fringed.”7 Broadly speaking, there are three popular theories of what 
the Second Amendment was designed to do and what it protects today. 
The first theory is sometimes referred to as the “collective rights” 
theory and posits that the Amendment was meant to protect state mi-
litias (which the U.S. Constitution subjugated to the federal govern-
ment in several clauses) from the new national government. As a con-
sequence, individual citizens under this theory have—at most—a right 
to possess weapons in connection with service in those state militias. 
Prior to Heller, the collective rights theory had the support of the Su-
preme Court (three times over),8 as well as the scholarly consensus be-
fore the late 1980s. 
The second theory is the “individual rights” theory, which argues 
that “the right of the people to keep and bear arms” protects the indi-
vidual right to possess and carry weapons for the purposes of self-de-
fense. This theory has been championed by conservative scholars like 
Joyce Lee Malcolm9 and liberals such as the Pulitzer Prize-winning 
historian Leonard Levy10 and Harvard Law Professor Laurence 
Tribe.11 
The third theory is something of a hybrid and is sometimes called 
the “insurrectionist theory.” Like the individual rights theory, the in-
 
 7.  U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 8.  United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886); 
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876). 
 9.  See JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN 
ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT (1994). 
 10.  See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 133–49 (1999). 
 11.  See 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 898, 901–02 (3d ed. 
2000). 
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surrectionist theory favors private gun ownership. But like the collec-
tive rights theory, it posits that the right has little to do with individual 
self-defense. The insurrectionist theory argues that the Amendment 
protects the right of the people collectively to bear arms, but for the 
much more serious purpose of keeping a tyrannical government in 
check. This camp is the domain of conservative scholars like Stephen 
Halbrook12 and prominent liberal law professors such as Sanford Lev-
inson of the University of Texas13 and Akhil Reed Amar of Yale.14 At a 
high level, these insurrectionist theorists could be regarded as cousins 
of the individual rights theorists. 
When the Supreme Court reentered the Second Amendment fray 
in Heller, the United States Courts of Appeals were split on the correct 
theory of the Second Amendment, with three circuits adopting an in-
dividual rights reading and ten circuits adopting one version or another 
of the collective rights reading.15 
 
 12.  See STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF 
A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 77 (1984). 
 13.  While Professor Levinson’s first foray might have been less definitive, see Sanford 
Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1989), he has since clarified 
that he believes more specifically in the “insurrectionist” view of the Second Amendment, see 
Sanford Levinson, The NRA Didn’t Help, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (2016) (“I have been publicly crit-
ical of Justice Scalia’s majority argument in the Heller case precisely because, like most lawyers, 
whether conservative or liberal, he preferred to ignore the ‘insurrectionist’ origins of the amend-
ment in favor of a tendentious and I think insupportable rewriting of American legal history 
turning the amendment, as understood in 1791, into the protection of an individual right to de-
fend oneself against criminals trying to break into one’s home.”). 
 14. See Akhil Reed Amar, Second Thoughts, THE NEW REPUBLIC (July 11, 1999) 
https://newrepublic.com/article/73718/second-thoughts (“A modern translation of the amend-
ment might thus be: ‘An armed and militarily trained citizenry being conducive to freedom, the 
right of the electorate to organize itself militarily shall not be infringed.’ Call this the communi-
tarian reading as opposed to the statist and libertarian readings that dominate modern discourse. 
Statists anachronistically read the ‘militia’ to mean the government (the paid professional offi-
cialdom) rather than the people (the ordinary citizenry). Equally anachronistically, libertarians 
read ‘the people’ to mean atomized private persons, each hunting in his own private Idaho, rather 
than the citizenry acting collectively. But, when the Constitution speaks of ‘the people’ rather 
than ‘persons,’ the collective connotation is primary.”). 
 15. PATRICK J. CHARLES, THE SECOND AMENDMENT: THE INTENT AND ITS 
INTERPRETATION BY THE STATES AND THE SUPREME COURT 6 (2009).  
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B.  Self-Defense or State Militias? The Debate in District of 
Columbia v. Heller 
By the mid-2000s, the District of Columbia had effectively banned 
handgun possession by first criminalizing the carrying of unregistered 
firearms and then completely prohibiting handgun registration.16 The 
District also required a license to carry handguns and mandated that 
residents keep all firearms “unloaded and disassembled or bound by a 
trigger lock or similar device” unless they were kept at a place of busi-
ness or being immediately used for recreational purposes.17 
Challenger Dick Heller was a D.C. special police officer who le-
gally carried a handgun while he was on duty in the District.18 After 
the city rejected his request to register a handgun he wished to keep in 
his home, Heller sued the District in federal district court, claiming 
that the Second Amendment protected his right to carry a functional 
firearm in the home without a license.19 Heller sought to enjoin the 
city’s ban on handgun registration, as well as the licensing and trigger-
lock requirements “insofar as [they] prohibit[ed] the use of ‘functional 
firearms within the home.’”20 The United States District Court dis-
missed Heller’s claim,21 but a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that the Second 
Amendment protects an individual right to possess functional firearms 
in the home for the purposes of self-defense.22 
The Supreme Court affirmed the panel’s decision.23 Justice Scalia, 
writing for the majority, described the introductory portion of the Sec-
ond Amendment (“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the se-
curity of a free State”) as the “prefatory clause” and the second portion 
of the Amendment (“the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, 
 
 16.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 574–75 (2008). 
 17.  Id. at 575. 
         18.   Id. 
 19.  Id. at 575–76. 
 20.  Id. at 576. 
 21.  Parker v. District of Columbia, 311 F. Supp. 2d 103, 109 (D.D.C. 2004). 
 22.  Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 395, 399–401 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 23.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 636. 
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shall not be infringed”) as the “operative clause.”24 Relying on the op-
erative clause’s text and history, he found that the phrase to keep and 
bear arms works with the Amendment’s prefatory clause to “guarantee 
the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confronta-
tion.”25 While the Court declined to outline the exact contours of this 
right, Justice Scalia concluded that, “whatever else it leaves to future 
evaluation, it surely elevates above all other interests the right of law-
abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and 
home.”26 
Justice Stevens disagreed. In a dissenting opinion joined by three 
other Justices, he argued that because “[t]he Second Amendment was 
adopted to protect the right of the people of each of the several States 
to maintain a well-regulated militia[,]” it protects only “the right to 
keep and bear arms for certain military purposes,”—i.e., it does not 
protect “the nonmilitary use and ownership of weapons.”27 
So in Heller the Supreme Court lent support to two of the main 
camps in the Second Amendment debate—the collective rights theory 
and the individual rights theory. Post-Heller, the battle for the correct 
history and interpretation of the Second Amendment has continued, 
with scholars and pundits casting and recasting arguments in support 
of either the individual rights and insurrectionist theories28 or the col-
lective rights theory.29 
 
 24.  Id. at 577. 
 25.  Id. at 592. 
 26.  Id. at 635. 
 27.  Id. at 637 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 28.  See David French, Of Course the Second Amendment Protects an Individual Right 
to Keep and Bear Arms, NAT’L REV. (Apr. 13, 2016 8:00 AM) https://www.nationalreview.com 
/2016/04/second-amendment-protects-individual-right-keep-bear-arms/; David Harsanyi, The 
Second Amendment Has Always Been an Individual Right, THE FEDERALIST (Nov. 29, 2018) 
https://thefederalist.com/2018/11/29/second-amendment-always-individual-right/. 
 29.  CHARLES, supra note 15. 
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III.  CORPUS LINGUISTICS: A CLUE TO ORIGINAL, ORDINARY 
MEANING 
A.  The Importance of Original, Ordinary Meaning in Constitutional 
Interpretation 
As the Heller Court put it, “[t]he Constitution was written to be 
understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in their nor-
mal and ordinary . . . meaning.”30 Judges, including the Justices of the 
Supreme Court, have increasingly purported to be guided by the orig-
inal, ordinary meaning of the text of the Constitution. Heller is a good 
example of this—even the four dissenting Justices relied in part on 
what they understood to be the original understanding of “the right to 
keep and bear arms.”31 
If it is true that most judges would not align themselves with a 
strong Justice Clarence Thomas-style originalism or even a more prec-
edent-fearing Justice Scalia-style originalism, it is also true that to a 
certain extent, “[w]e are all originalists”32 now.33 Most judges seem to 
believe that the starting point of any constitutional inquiry is “the orig-
inal communicative content of the words of the Constitution.”34 Most 
 
 30.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 576 (quoting United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931)). 
Of course, what “ordinary meaning” actually means is not always clear, as Utah Supreme Court 
Associate Chief Justice Thomas R. Lee and Stephen Mouritsen have pointed out. Thomas R. Lee 
& Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, 127 YALE L.J. 788, 798–800 (2018) (giving 
examples of how judges have used “ordinary meaning” to refer to possible meaning, common 
meaning, most frequent meaning, exclusive meaning, and prototypical meaning). 
 31.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 637–38 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The view of the Amendment we 
took in Miller—that it protects the right to keep and bear arms for certain military purposes, but 
that it does not curtail the Legislature’s power to regulate the nonmilitary use and ownership of 
weapons—is both the most natural reading of the Amendment’s text and the interpretation most 
faithful to the history of its adoption.”). 
 32.  Jonathan H. Adler, The Judiciary Committee Grills Elena Kagan, WASH. POST, 
(June 29, 2010, 1:18PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/ 
06201o/o6/29/ 
AR2010062902652AR210062902652.html (quoting Justice Elena Kagan as saying, “We are all 
originalists,” in her 2010 confirmation hearing). 
 33.  This is not an attempt to broaden the traditional formal or colloquial definitions of 
“originalism” to the point of meaninglessness—rather, it is an attempt to show that even many 
of those who would normally not consider themselves “originalists” are still interested in discov-
ering and considering original communicative content. 
 34. Thomas R. Lee & James C. Phillips, Data-Driven Originalism, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 
261, 270 (2019). Of course, Justice Lee and Professor Phillips are making the more modest claim 
that all originalists (including original intentions originalists and original methods originalists) 
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even seem to agree that this original communicative content is the end-
ing point of constitutional interpretation where such content is 
“clearly established.”35 
To be sure, there may be a great deal of dispute among “original-
ists” (again, speaking broadly) about whether the original understand-
ing of a Constitutional text in a given case is constraining—or even 
determinable. But there seem to be just as few judges willing to say that 
the original understanding of the Constitution is not fixed (and there-
fore, irrelevant) as there are judges willing to say that the text of a stat-
ute is not fixed (and therefore, irrelevant).36 So the original under-
standing or communicative content of a text is of interest to anyone 
called upon to interpret a Constitutional provision—however large a 
role that interpreter deems that linguistic determination should ulti-
mately play. Truly, then, “[a]ll the action in . . . constitutional inter-
pretation is . . . after the threshold inquiry into original communicative 
content.”37 
Assuming judges can discover what the original communicative 
content of a Constitutional provision is, how should they go about it? 
One particularly promising and powerful tool is corpus linguistics. 
 
are in some degree original public meaning originalists, not that all constitutional interpreters 
are originalists. 
         35.  Id. 
 36. See Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original 
Meaning, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 2 (2015) (contrasting the “Fixation Thesis” with the “Con-
straint Principle” and arguing that perhaps a better definition of a living constitutionalist is one 
who either (1) “accept[s] that the linguistic meaning (or more precisely, communicative content) 
of the constitutional text is fixed” but that the “legal meaning (or more precisely legal content) 
of the Constitution . . . changes over time,” or (2) “accept[s] both fixation and constraint, but 
believe[s] that the actual meaning of specific provisions of the constitutional text is underdeter-
minate . . . .”). Even the late Judge Harry Pregerson, who infamously declared in his confirmation 
hearing that, “[I]f I had to follow my conscience or the law, I would follow my conscience,” never 
actually declared the original communicative content of words irrelevant—he just thought it 
wasn’t determinative in all cases. Emily Langer, Henry Pregerson, Federal Judge Who Placed 




 37. Lee & Phillips, supra note 34, at 266 (emphasis added). 
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B.  Corpus Linguistics: A Way to Original, Ordinary Meaning 
In simplest terms, corpus linguistics is the empirical analysis of 
how a given group of people (a “speech community”) used a given 
word or phrase at a given time. Corpus linguists use large databases of 
words called corpora (singular: corpus) that are comprised of the text 
of newspapers, books, speeches, television and movie transcripts, etc., 
from the desired time period to see how a speech community actually 
used words—how often, and in what context.38 The legal application is 
obvious—by looking at how words naturally occurred in a speech com-
munity’s past communications, judges can more objectively approxi-
mate how that speech community would (or should) have understood 
those words if and when they became the subject of a heated legal dis-
pute.39 Thus, a corpus linguistics analysis enhances the objectivity of 
legal interpretation’s search for original, “ordinary meaning”40 in at 
least two interrelated ways. 
First, a corpus linguistics analysis increases accuracy and determi-
nacy because judges can see how words are used in hundreds, thou-
sands, or even millions of different contexts; they don’t have to base 
linguistic claims on a few isolated literary examples or dictionary defi-
nitions (or worse, their own naked intuition). Without corpus data, 
judges are not just operating with limited—and therefore less reliable 
 
 38.  See James Heilpern, Dialects of Art: A Corpus-Based Approach to Technical Term 
of Art Determinations in Statutes, 58 JURIMETRICS 377, 389 (2018).  
 39.  In this way, corpus linguistics analysis avoids a common criticism of relying on legis-
lative history—namely, that it is susceptible to individuals “salting the record,” or underhandedly 
dictating the meaning of a word or phrase by preemptively utilizing it in a new and creative way. 
Whatever the prevalence of this “salting the record” problem actually is when it comes to legis-
lative history, it is impossible to imagine that enough members of a speech community would (or 
could) correctly anticipate a discrete linguistic legal controversy enough to systematically change 
their use of that language just to alter the outcome of that particular case. In fact, because corpus 
linguistics looks at how words were used in specific moments in time, it specifically guards against 
“linguistic drift” (the phenomenon that words can and do change their meanings over time). See 
Lee & Phillips, supra note 34 at 265.  
 40.  Again, what “ordinary meaning” actually means is not always clear. See Lee & Mour-
itsen, supra note 30, at 798–800. But whatever we mean by “ordinary meaning” in any given case 
or context, any time we invoke it we are making some claim about the frequency with which the 
word or phrase is used. Id. at 831–32 (“[C]orpora can be used to measure the statistical frequency 
of words and word senses in a given speech community and over a given time period. Whether 
we regard the ordinary meaning of a given word to be the possible, common, or the most com-
mon sense of that word in a given context, linguistic corpora allows us to determine empirically 
where a contested sense of a term falls on that continuum.”). 
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and representative—information, they are leaving themselves more 
susceptible to motivated reasoning and confirmation bias.41 It is a lot 
easier to skew data (innocently or otherwise) when your analysis is 
based on texts of your own choosing. 
Second, corpus linguistics analysis improves the transparency of 
the original, ordinary meaning inquiry because it is a replicable and 
therefore falsifiable enterprise.42 Citing corpus linguistics as the basis 
for a claim regarding the frequency or ordinariness of a term is the 
equivalent of showing one’s work. When a court claims that a word 
had a given meaning at a given time because of a corpus search, experts, 
higher courts, and other third-party observers can look at the court’s 
methodology and data and perform their own corpus linguistics anal-
ysis to verify the court’s results and conclusions.43 (Unfortunately, this 
also means that when a recent law school graduate performs a corpus 
search and makes certain claims about the Second Amendment, much 
more qualified academics can review and critique his work.) 
In short, corpus linguistics can enhance the accuracy of judges’ lin-
guistic determinations and help constrain their natural biases. 
C.  Corpus Linguistics: A Tool as Old as Time 
“Corpus linguistics” might sound strange and intimidating—not 
unlike a Harry Potter incantation44—but the reality is that each of us 
performs a kind of corpus linguistics in his or her head every day. Every 
time someone speaks to us, we are taking those spoken words and giv-
ing them meaning based on—among other things45—how we have 
 
 41.  See id. at 867–68 (“Without [corpus linguistics], judges will tap into their linguistic 
memory to make assessments about the frequency or prototypicality of a given sense of a statutory 
term. Such recourse to memory and judicial intuition is neither transparent nor replicable. Noth-
ing is statistically worse than one data point—especially a biased one. The potential for motivated 
reasoning is evident.”). 
 42.  See id. at 829. 
 43.  See Lee & Phillips, supra note 34, at 292–93 (“With traditional originalist tools, 
there’s a take-my-word-for-it element. But corpus analysis democratizes the inquiry, opening up 
the data and the conclusions drawn from it to everyone. No one has to take the originalist’s word 
for it. Anyone can look at the same data and try to replicate or falsify the conclusions.”).  
 44.  See, e.g., J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE HALF-BLOOD PRINCE 238 
(2005) (“There were many crossings-out and alterations, but finally, crammed into a corner of a 
page, the scribble: Levicorpus (nvbl).”). 
 45.  See Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 30, at 815–16 (“Whenever we engage in the act of 
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heard and used those words in dozens, hundreds, or thousands of con-
texts. In this sense, all formal or computerized corpus linguistics aims 
to do is make that root database or corpus more representative of the 
relevant population. In other words, when we perform a corpus search 
based on texts from a targeted speech community, we are estimating 
what those words mean based on the shared experiences of—ideally—
all the people in the relevant speech community, rather than the lin-
guistic experiences of just one person. You could say corpus linguistics 
is an attempt to crowdsource linguistic intuition. 
Even when it comes to corpus linguistics’ application to particular 
cases and controversies, this “new” field is simply a more robust and 
technologically advanced version of what judges and legal scholars 
have been trying to accomplish for decades: determine the meaning of 
words by looking at how they are used in other relevant contexts. 
For example, in Muscarello v. United States, Justice Stephen 
Breyer “surveyed modern press usage . . . by searching computerized 
newspaper databases—both the New York Times data base in 
Lexis/Nexis, and the ‘U.S. News’ data base in Westlaw” to confirm the 
Court’s interpretation of carry as it pertained to guns.46 Likewise, in 
Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd., Justice Samuel Alito conducted 
an extensive “survey of . . . relevant dictionaries” to determine that the 
“ordinary or common meaning” of interpreter did not include transla-
tors of written texts.47 
And Supreme Court Justices are not alone. Judge Richard Posner 
conducted a Google search in United States v. Costello—”based on 
the supposition that the number of hits per term is a rough index of 
the frequency of its use”—to conclude that “allowing your boyfriend 
 
communication—whenever a speaker speaks and a hearer hears—our minds take in the relevant 
interpretative information at once. We take account of the formal aspects of an utterance (its 
lexical, syntactic, and semantic content), as well as the pragmatic (in the linguistic sense of the 
term) aspects of the utterance (for example, the physical or social setting in which it is uttered). 
We interpret an utterance as part of a community of speakers of a language (with shared linguistic 
conventions and a shared understanding of different linguistic registers), and we necessarily in-
terpret the utterance according to the shared linguistic conventions that exist at the time of the 
utterance.”).  
 46.  Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 129 (1998). 
 47.  Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd., 556 U.S. 560, 569 (2012). 
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to live with you may not be harboring, even if you know he shouldn’t 
be in the United States.”48 
Indeed, some judges have begun to rely on corpus linguistics as the 
key to resolving cases dealing with linguistic ambiguity. Associate 
Chief Justice Thomas Lee of the Utah Supreme Court, for example, 
has relied on corpus linguistics in a variety of contexts.49 In 2016, the 
Michigan Supreme Court used corpus linguistics to determine that in-
formation as used by the Michigan State Legislature included false as 
well as true information.50 And just a few terms ago, Justice Thomas 
cited corpus linguistics data in his United States v. Carpenter51 dissent 
and an article relying on corpus linguistics data in his Lucia v. SEC52 
concurrence (the latter was joined by Justice Neil Gorsuch). 
D.  The Corpora 
Today, two of the most relevant and popular corpora for research 
on the original meaning of the Constitution are Brigham Young Uni-
versity’s Corpus of Founding Era American English (COFEA) and the 
Corpus of Early Modern English (COEME). COFEA is a database 
currently comprised of over 154 million words from American docu-
ments “including letters, diaries, newspapers, non-fiction books, fic-
tion, sermons, speeches, debates, legal cases, and other legal materials” 
from the beginning of the reign of King George III in 1760 to the 
 
 48.  United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040, 1044–45 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 49.  See, e.g., State v. Rasabout, 356 P.3d 1258, 1275–82 (Utah 2015) (Lee, J., concurring) 
(using corpus linguistics to confirm that “discharge of a weapon is used overwhelmingly in the 
single shot sense”); State v. J.M.S. (In re Interest of J.M.S.,), 280 P.3d 410, 418–19 (Utah 2011) 
(Lee, J., concurring) (using corpus linguistics to confirm that the “ordinary and accepted meaning 
of the term ‘procedure’ is limited to medical methods”); In re Adoption of Baby E.Z. v. T.I.Z., 
266 P.3d 702, 724 n.21 (Utah 2011) (Lee, J., concurring) (using corpus linguistics to confirm that 
the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act’s use of “custody determination” does not reach 
adoption proceedings). 
 50.  People v. Harris, 885 N.W.2d 832, 838–42 (Mich. 2016). 
 51.  Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2238 n.4 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 52.  Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2056–57 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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death of George Washington in 1799.53 By contrast, COEME is a col-
lection of English books and documents comprised of 40,300 texts 
from the years 1475 to 1800.54 
E.  Two Tools of Corpus Linguistics 
There are several corpus tools that can help shed light on ordinary 
meaning, but some of the most popular are concordance lines and fre-
quency data. These will be briefly explained so that the reader is better 
equipped to understand the research discussed in this Note. 
1.  Concordance lines 
The concordance function (also known as the key word in context 
or “KWIC” function) has been aptly described as “the meat-and-po-
tatoes of determining meaning from corpus analysis,”55 because it “al-
lows . . . users to review a particular word or phrase in hundreds of 
contexts, all on the same page of running text.”56 Put simply, concord-
ance lines are the strings of text a searchable corpus returns in response 
to a query; they provide the crucial context in which different instan-
tiations of the searched term have occurred. By coding or categorizing 
a simple random sample of concordance lines, researchers can survey 
the sense-distribution of the searched term and extrapolate conclu-
sions about how the term is used in the full corpus.57 Again, this is 
something judges have been doing for quite some time, albeit on a 
much smaller and more rudimentary scale—take, for example, the 
Muscarello Court’s analysis of certain text samples from the King 
James Bible, Robinson Crusoe, and Moby Dick.58 
 
 53.  BYU LAW: LAW & CORPUS LINGUISTICS, https://lawcorpus.byu.edu/ (last visited on 
Oct. 23, 2019). “The majority of texts have been pulled from the following six sources: the Na-
tional Archive Founders Online; William S. Hein & Co., HeinOnline; Text Creation Partnership 
(TCP) Evans Bibliography (University of Michigan); Elliot’s Debates; Farrand’s Records; and 
the U.S. Statutes-at-Large from the first five Congresses.” Id.  
         54.  Id. 
 55.  Lee & Phillips, supra note 34, at 308–09. 
 56.  Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 30, at 832. 
 57.  Of course, ideally one would code all the concordance lines a search returns—but 
unless the number of concordance lines is relatively small, this is usually a daunting task.  
 58.  Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 129 (1998). 
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2.  Frequency data 
Frequency data allow us to see how often a word is used, as well as 
how often that word is used in a particular “genre” or register of doc-
uments (e.g., legal texts, colloquial texts),59 which in turn may provide 
us valuable insights into a word’s meaning.60 In the context of COFEA, 
for example, if a phrase appears more frequently in Hein Online doc-
uments (a collection of legal texts) than in Evans Early American Im-
prints documents (a collection of early American books, pamphlets, 
and broadsides), we might have reason to believe that the phrase is a 
legal term of art, or that at least one sense of the phrase bears a tech-
nical or specialized legal meaning.61 
IV.  THE “WEAPONIZATION” OF CORPUS LINGUISTICS 
A.  Applications for the Second Amendment 
Scholars have long recognized corpus linguistics’ potential in the 
Second Amendment debate. In Heller, several linguists submitted an 
amicus brief that drew conclusions about the meaning of bear arms 
from 115 Founding Era documents.62 
This scholarship has continued because the Supreme Court relied 
heavily on historical linguistic claims in Heller. While the Court has 
never settled on one sense of “ordinary meaning”63 or decided that the 
 
 59.  See Lee & Phillips, supra note 34, at 290. 
 60.  Note that coding is also required to gain this latter insight regarding in which “gen-
res” a certain sense of a word appears. See id. at 291. 
 61.  See id. at 293–94; see also James Cleith Phillips & Sara White, The Meaning of the 
Three Emoluments Clauses in the U.S. Constitution: A Corpus Linguistics Analysis of American 
English from 1760–1799, 59 S. TEX. L. REV. 181, 208 (2017). 
 62.  Brief for Professors of Linguistics and English Dennis E. Baron et al. in Support of 
Petitioners, District of Columbia v. Heller, 552 U.S. 1229 (2008) (No. 07-290) [hereinafter Lin-
guists’ Brief]. 
 63.  Sometimes the Court has relied on a word’s most common meaning. See, e.g., 
Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd., 556 U.S. 560, 568 (2012) (“That a definition is broad 
enough to encompass one sense of a word does not establish that the word is ordinarily under-
stood in that sense.”); FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U.S. 397, 403 (2011) (“‘Personal’ ordinarily refers 
to individuals. We do not usually speak of personal characteristics, personal effects, personal cor-
respondence, personal influence, or personal tragedy as referring to corporations or other artifi-
cial entities.”). At other times, members have seemed to adopt a possible meaning as ordinary 
meaning. See, e.g., Muscarello v. United States 524 U.S. 125, 140 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissent-
ing). 
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original ordinary meaning is always the proper basis for a decision,64 
the Heller Court explicitly claimed to be guided by the principle that, 
“[t]he Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its 
words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary . . . mean-
ing.”65 
Specifically, Heller wrestled with the linguistic ambiguity sur-
rounding several phrases—the right of the people, keep arms, bear 
arms, and keep and bear arms as a whole. Even if the Court would have 
reached the same conclusion based on other grammatical or historical 
claims or policy considerations, how the Founding generation under-
stood the words of the Second Amendment was held up as a key reason 
for the outcome in Heller. As such, several scholars have attempted to 
use corpus linguistics to test whether the historical linguistic claims 
made by Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens are true. 
B.  Corpus Linguistics Research on the Second Amendment to Date 
1.  Bear arms 
By far the most analyzed portion of the Second Amendment is the 
phrase bear arms. This was the focus of the Linguists’ Brief in Heller, 
which surveyed 115 instances of bear arms from “books, pamphlets, 
broadsides and newspapers from the period between the Declaration 
of Independence and the adoption of the Second Amendment.”66 Re-
lying in part on the fact that 110 of these instances “were used in a 
clearly military context,” the brief concluded that “the right that is pro-
tected is the right of the people to serve in the military and keep mili-
tary weaponry for such service.”67 
 
 64.  The Court has not always been so disciplined. See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 
100-01 (1958) (“The Court [has] recognized . . . that the words of the Amendment are not pre-
cise, and that their scope is not static. The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”). 
 65.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576 (2008) (quoting United States v. 
Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931)). 
 66.  Linguists’ Brief at 24. 
 67.  Id. at 3, 24. 
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One of these linguists, Professor Dennis Baron, has since per-
formed searches using both COFEA and COEME.68 His searches for 
bear arms returned 310 hits in COFEA and 1578 hits in COEME.69 
After evaluating an impressive 1300 of these concordance lines and re-
moving duplicates, he concluded that 900 instances “refer[red] to war, 
soldiering, or other forms of armed action by a group rather than an 
individual” while only seven were “ambiguous or carried no military 
connotation.”70 Professor Baron argues that this means that “the nat-
ural meaning of bear arms in the framers’ day was military or quasi-
military.”71 
Using a slightly different collective sense versus individual sense 
framework, University of Chicago professors Alison LaCroix and Ja-
son Merchant analyzed 181 references of bear arms from a 1760 to 
1795 Google Books search and concluded that 67.4% were used “in a 
collective sense,” while just 18.2% were used “in an individual sense.”72 
In response to Professor Baron’s preliminary findings73 and Pro-
fessor LaCroix’s research, Professor Josh Blackman and James Phillips 
sampled 50 COFEA concordance lines from 1760 to 1799 and also 
concluded that “the overwhelming majority of instances of ‘bear arms’ 
was in the military context.”74 Notably, Blackman and Phillips 
searched COFEA not just for bear arms, but rather for any instance of 
 
 68.  Dennis Baron, Corpus Evidence Illuminates the Meaning of Bear Arms, 46 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 509 (2019). 
 69.  Id. at 510. 
 70.  Id. at 510–11. It is doubtful that searching for the phrase bear arms (rather than 
searching for any form of bear within a certain span of arms) is the most comprehensive way to 
conduct this research. It is also unclear why all the years of data from 1475 to 1800 would be 
relevant for an inquiry into how the framers and ratifiers of the Second Amendment would have 
understood the phrase. But since Professor Baron’s framework is based on the military versus 
nonmilitary distinction and he found only a handful of examples of nonmilitary uses, having too 
wide a timeframe does not seem to have altered the analysis much.  
 71.  Id. at 511. 
 72.  Allison L. LaCroix, Historical Semantics and the Meaning of the Second Amend-
ment, PANORAMA (August 3, 2018), http://thepanorama.shear.org/2018/08/03/historical-se-
mantics-and-the-meaning-of-the-second-amendment/. 
 73.  Dennis Baron, Antonin Scalia Was Wrong About the Meaning of ‘Bear Arms’, 
WASH. POST (May 21, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/antonin-scalia-was-
wrong-about-the-meaning-of-bear-arms/2018/05/21/9243ac66-5d11-11e8-b2b8-
08a538d9dbd6_story.html.  
 74.  Josh Blackman & James C. Phillips, Corpus Linguistics and the Second Amendment, 
HARV. L. REV. BLOG (Aug. 7, 2018),) https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/corpus-linguistics-and-
the-second-amendment/. 
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the words arm or arms within four words of any form of the verb to 
bear. 
Lawyer and linguist Neal Goldfarb, who began publishing exten-
sive Second Amendment corpus linguistics research as I wrote this 
Note,75 has taken a different approach. In fact, he uses a framework 
similar to the one I use in Parts IV and V. Instead of jumping straight 
to a conclusion on whether the Second Amendment protects a collec-
tive right to serve in the militia or an individual right to own and carry 
firearms, Goldfarb decided to take the Heller opinion at its word and 
discern whether bear arms actually meant to literally carry weapons.76 
First, Goldfarb performed preliminary collocation and concord-
ance line analyses on bear and carry and concluded that, “at the time 
of the framing of the Constitution, bear was in general not synony-
mous with carry.”77 More specifically, Goldfarb interpreted this data 
to mean that by the time of the Founding, carry was being used more 
to discuss the wearing or moving of tangible objects, while bear was 
being used more to refer to figurative weights and burdens.78 
Second, Goldfarb performed a concordance line analysis on arms 
to determine whether its ordinary meaning was synonymous with 
weapons.79 After some preliminary research, he concluded that while 
arms often did literally mean weapons, there were many senses of arms 
that he believed were parts of more figurative or specialized military 
phrases (e.g., to arms, force of arms).80 He then performed several cor-
pus searches and concluded that of the 706 concordance lines from 
COFEA’s Evans Early American Imprint Series, the ratio of weapons 
senses to military senses was 75 (20.5%) to 290 (79.5%), meaning a 
 
 75.  Neal Goldfarb, Corpora and the Second Amendment, LAWNLINGUISTICS, 
https://lawnlinguistics.com/corpora-and-the-second-amendment/ (last updated Aug. 8, 2018) 
(listing all Goldfarb’s blog posts on the subject). 
 76.  Goldfarb ultimately tested whether bear arms meant to carry weapons in case of con-
frontation, holding the Heller Court to its most specific claim. 
 77.  Neal Goldfarb, Corpora and the Second Amendment: “Bear”, LAWNLINGUISTICS 
(Dec. 16, 2018, 3:45 PM), https://lawnlinguistics.com/2018/12/16/corpora-and-the-second-
amendment-bear/. Notably, Goldfarb restricted his COEME data to the same years available in 
COFEA, 1760–1799. 
         78.  Id. 
          79.  Neal Goldfarb, Corpora and the Second Amendment: “Arms”, LAWNLINGUISTICS 
(Feb. 20, 2019, 3:01 PM), https://lawnlinguistics.com/2019/02/20/corpora-and-the-second-
amendment-arms/. 
         80.  Id. 
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military sense was 3.8 times as common as a weapons sense.81 Similarly, 
of the 685 COEME concordance lines, the ratio was 112 (30%) to 262 
(70%), meaning a military sense was 2.3 times as common as a weapons 
sense.82 On the other hand, of the 707 concordance lines from 
COFEA’s Hein Online and Founders Papers Online, the pattern was 
just the opposite—there were 413 weapons senses (66%) to 213 mili-
tary senses (34%), or nearly 2 times as many weapons senses.83 Gold-
farb attributes this discrepancy to the fact that the Founders Papers 
Online contained significant correspondence relating to the Revolu-
tionary War.84 
Finally, Goldfarb searched COFEA and COEME for all iterations 
of arms that occurred within four words of any form of the verb bear 
between 1760 and 1799 and found 756 concordance lines.85 Crucially, 
he excluded 221 lines—not just those that were patently irrelevant 
(e.g., bearing arms as in bearing a coat of arms), but also all proposed 
or ratified constitutional amendments referring to the right to bear 
arms (a total of 22 lines).86 Goldfarb reasoned that “[g]iven that the 
issue to be decided is how the right to keep and bear arms as used in 
the Second Amendment was likely to have be[en] understood, there 
[is] nothing to be learned from considering uses of that very phrase or 
of closely related variants, in a similar context.”87 
Goldfarb concluded that of his 535 remaining concordance lines, 
only 11 (2%) “unambiguously” used bear arms to mean carry weap-
ons.88 He did, however, admit that he “couldn’t point to a specific fac-
tor ruling out the possibility” that an additional 15 lines (2.8%) “would 
have been understood to express the ‘natural meaning’ that was de-
clared by Heller.”89 In short, Goldfarb concluded that at least 95% of 
 
         81.   Id. 
         82.  Id. 
         83.  Id. 
 84.   Id. Of course, it is likely that the Second Amendment was also written with the events 
of the then-recent Revolutionary War in mind.  
 85. Neal Goldfarb, Corpora and the Second Amendment: “Bear Arms” (Part 2), 
LAWNLINGUISTICS (Apr. 30, 2019, 11:18 PM), https://lawnlinguistics.com/2019/04/30/cor-
pora-and-the-second-amendment-bear-arms-part-2/. 
         86.  Id. 
          87.  Id. 
          88.  Id. 
         89. Id. 
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all instances of bear arms were used in a more “figurative” military 
sense.90 
2.  Keep arms 
Less research has been done on keep arms.91 Blackman and Phillips 
searched COFEA for all instances of arm or arms within four words of 
any form of the verb to keep, but ultimately they were able to code 
only 18 of their sample size of 50 concordance lines.92 Of that limited 
sample, they found around half related to keeping arms “in the military 
context,” a quarter related to a “private sense,” and the remaining 
quarter were ambiguous.93 
3.  Keep and bear arms 
As of this writing, there has been little commentary on the fact that 
the phrase keep and bear arms is virtually nonexistent outside the con-
text of the Second Amendment. As this Note reveals, this has signifi-
cant ramifications for Justice Stevens’s suggestion that the Second 
Amendment protects a “unitary right.” 
4.  The right of the people 
Neal Goldfarb has been responsible for virtually all the corpus lin-
guistics commentary on the right of the people. Goldfarb takes issue 
 
          90.  Id. 
          91.  Neal Goldfarb did make some interesting observations about the nature of the verb 
keep and raised doubts about whether it doesn’t also have its own touch of idiomaticity, Neal 
Goldfarb, Corpora and the Second Amendment: “Keep” (Part 2), LAWNLINGUISTICS (Oct. 21, 
2018, 11:13 AM), https://lawnlinguistics.com/2018/10/21/corpora-and-the-second-amend-
ment-keep-part-2/, but he ultimately concluded that he did not see any value in conducting a 
specific keep arms analysis. Neal Goldfarb, Corpora and the Second Amendment: Changing My 
Mind About a Change of Mind, LAWNLINGUISTICS (Feb. 29, 2019, 5:25 PM), https://lawnlin-
guistics.com/2019/02/26/corpora-and-the-second-amendment-changing-my-mind-about-a-
change-of-mind/ (“After initially declaring that I wouldn’t be posting about the phrase keep arms 
because I had nothing interesting to say about it, and then declaring that upon further reflection 
I did have something interesting to say, I’ve realized after drafting a post discussing the phrase 
that I was right the first time.”). 
          92.  Blackman & Phillips, supra note 74. Blackman and Phillips excluded the other 32 as 
either duplicates or quotations of the Second Amendment.  
          93.  Id. 
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with the Court’s assumption that those state constitutions that dis-
cussed “the people’s right” to defend themselves or that declared “the 
people have a right” to bear arms for the defense of themselves “un-
ambiguously” protected an individual rather than a collective right.94 
He argues that unless these clauses included additional language such 
as “each” or “every citizen,” it is unclear whether they were meant to 
protect collective or individual action.95 Searching for both the peo-
ple’s right and the people have a right in COFEA and COEME, Gold-
farb concluded that of 105 relevant concordance lines, 63 (60%) were 
clearly discussing collective rights (e.g., “the right to alter the Consti-
tution,” “the right to set up a civil government”), 24 (22.8%) were 
“both collective and at least arguably distributive [individual],” one was 
ambiguous, and just 17 (16.2%) clearly protected an individual right.96 
Goldfarb then performed a separate analysis on the Second 
Amendment’s phrase the right of the people and came to similar con-
clusions. Of 118 relevant hits, he coded 75 (63.6%) as collective, 29 
(24.6%) as collective and arguably individual, 7 (6%) as ambiguous, 
and only 7 (6%) as clearly individual.97 
Goldfarb argues his research “lends weight to the argument that 
the right of self-defense protected by [some of] the state constitutional 
provisions . . . should be understood as a right of collective self-de-
fense, and therefore as a right associated with service in a militia.”98 
This would not only suggest that some lines that could otherwise be 
coded as uses of the carrying sense are actually examples of the special-
ized sense,99 but also that the ultimate “military right” conclusion 
drawn by the Heller dissenters was correct. Of course, this finding 
would also be consistent with the insurrectionist theory of the Second 
Amendment. 
 
 94. Neal Goldfarb, Corpora and the Second Amendment: “Bear Arms” (Part 1), Plus a 
Look at “The People”, LAWNLINGUISTICS (Apr. 29, 2019, 2:19 PM), https://lawnlinguis-
tics.com/ 2019/04/29/corpora-and-the-second-amendment-bear-arms-part-1-plus-a-look-at-
the-people/. 
          95.   Id. 
 96.  Id. Goldfarb excluded any concordance line referencing a right to “bear arms.” 
          97.   Id. 
          98.   Id. 
 99. Since Goldfarb excluded these state constitutional amendments from his analysis, this 
point is only relevant for this Note’s coding.  
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V.  METHODOLOGY 
There are many linguistic claims in Heller, but this Note addresses 
just three: (A) whether the Second Amendment protects a “unitary 
right” to “keep and bear arms,” (B) whether at the time of the Found-
ing the more natural meaning of bear arms was carry weapons, and (C) 
whether at the time of the Founding the idiomatic sense of bear arms 
was always followed by the preposition against. 
A.  Testing Whether the Second Amendment Protects a “Unitary 
Right” 
After analyzing the Second Amendment’s prefatory clause and de-
termining that the “people” referenced in the operative clause is lim-
ited to those serving in the state militia, Justice Stevens asserted that 
the Second Amendment’s protection of the right of the people to “keep 
and bear arms” protects a “single right” (or “a duty and a right”) “to 
have arms available and ready for military service, and to use them for 
military purposes when necessary.”100 
This Note tested this claim by searching COFEA for instances of 
to keep and bear arms in the decades leading up to the passage of the 
Second Amendment. The theory was that if the corpus search returned 
many results of this precise phrase, it would be likely that the phrase 
was in fact a term of art—particularly if those results tended to be com-
prised of legal texts. If the search did not produce such results, it would 
be much less likely that the phrase was a term of art before the passage 
of the Second Amendment. 
Likewise, if the corpus data showed that the phrase was used ex-
tensively after the writing of the Second Amendment, it would suggest 
that the Amendment gave birth to or established keep and bear arms 
as a term of art. 
B.  Testing Whether “Bear Arms” Meant “Carry Weapons” 
As the research in Part III shows, corpus linguistics can shed a lot 
of light on the phrase bear arms. Most of this research has coded in-
stances of bear arms using either a military sense versus nonmilitary 
 
         100.   District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 651 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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sense framework or a collective sense versus individual sense frame-
work. But this Note argues that neither of these frameworks is the best 
way to determine what bear arms meant in the context of the Second 
Amendment—at least not if we want to critique Justice Scalia’s analysis 
on its own terms. 
That’s because both the military sense versus nonmilitary sense 
framework and the collective sense versus individual sense framework 
fail to directly address Heller’s central linguistic claim—that bear arms 
literally meant carry weapons.101 Instead, these frameworks place a 
thumb on the scale in favor of a more limited militia right. Even if bear 
arms did exclusively mean carry weapons at the time of the Founding, 
it would presumably still be used overwhelmingly in military contexts. 
After all, the relevant texts were all written during or near the time of 
the Revolutionary War, and weapons are primarily used for combat.102 
For these same reasons, the finding that bear arms appeared more of-
ten in collective rather than individual contexts seems to prove little. 
Blackman and Phillips explained why we cannot simply place corpus 
results in “context” buckets as opposed to strict “sense” buckets: “If we 
search a corpus for ‘to read,’ we will find more instances of people 
reading a newspaper than reading a street sign, even though both in-
stances draw on the same meaning of ‘to read.’“103 
So the more relevant inquiry regarding the scope of the right to 
keep and bear arms, at least as the Supreme Court sees it, is how often 
Founding Era Americans used bear arms in a so-called specialized 
sense (i.e. to serve in the military or engage in combat) versus how 
often they used bear arms in the carrying sense (i.e. to literally wear, 
hold, or wield weapons)—not how often bear arms was used in collec-
tive or military contexts versus individual ones. 
This Note used this specialized sense versus carrying sense frame-
work even though Justice Scalia ultimately concluded that the Second 
 
 101.  See, e.g., Heller, 554 U.S. at 584 (“At the time of the founding, as now, to ‘bear’ meant 
to ‘carry.’”); id. at 589 (“If ‘bear arms’ means, as we think, simply the carrying of arms. . . .”).  
 102.  Justice Scalia made this point about the smaller sample used in the Linguists’ Brief: 
“It is especially unremarkable that the phrase was often used in a military context in the federal 
legal sources (such as records of congressional debate) that have been the focus of petitioners’ 
inquiry. Those sources would have had little occasion to use it except in discussions about the 
standing army and the militia.” Id. at 587. 
 103.  Blackman & Phillips, supra note 74. 
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Amendment “guarantee[s] the individual right to possess and carry 
weapons in case of confrontation.”104 As Justice Stevens noted, “No 
party or amicus urged this interpretation; the Court appears to have 
fashioned it out of whole cloth.”105 Because it is not obvious to me that 
the “in case of confrontation” language was necessary to the Court’s 
self-defense individual rights reading of the Second Amendment, I be-
lieved there was little to be gained by holding the Court to this more 
specific linguistic claim. After all, if citizens have an individual right to 
carry weapons, that right necessarily includes the right to carry weap-
ons “in case[s] of confrontation”106 or for the purposes of “offensive or 
defensive action.”107 
We already have an idea of how this specialized sense versus car-
rying sense framework would work because Goldfarb used it in his Sec-
ond Amendment corpus linguistics research. But this Note’s research 
is still valuable because it disagrees with Goldfarb’s coding in several 
respects. 
For example, there are several uses of bear arms that Goldfarb au-
tomatically coded as “figurative”—e.g., refuse to bear arms, ex-
empted/excused/released from bearing arms, able to bear arms, capa-
ble of bearing arms, fit to bear arms, bear arms in defence of, etc.—
that I did not. While I interpreted many of these instances of bear arms 
to be using the figurative or specialized sense, the context seemed to 
suggest that others were invoking the carrying sense, and I coded them 
accordingly. 
Goldfarb also decided to exclude from his analysis all proposed and 
final drafts of the Second Amendment and its variants. While Goldfarb 
raises valid concerns about the wisdom of assuming that state consti-
tutions unambiguously protected an individual right, that is not the 
 
 104.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 592 (emphasis added). 
 105.  Id. at 646 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia may have limited himself in an effort 
to claim he was simply applying Justice Ginsburg’s (modern) definition of “carry” from Musca-
rello and make a jab at the dissent: “In Muscarello . . . Justice [Ginsburg] wrote that ‘[s]urely a 
most familiar meaning is, as the Constitution’s Second Amendment . . . indicate[s]: wear, bear, 
or carry [. . . ] for the purpose . . . of being armed and ready for offensive or defensive action in a 
case of conflict with another person.’ We think that Justice [Ginsburg] accurately captured the 
natural meaning of ‘bear arms.’” Id. at 584 (majority opinion) (emphasis added) (internal quota-
tions and citations omitted). Neal Goldfarb has commented extensively on the Heller Court’s 
faulty incorporation of Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Muscarello. Goldfarb, supra note 94.  
 106.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 592. 
 107.  Id. at 584. 
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relevant question. All the specialized sense versus carrying sense 
framework cares about is whether these state Second Amendments em-
ployed bear arms in the specialized sense or the carrying sense. As such, 
I included and coded Second Amendment variants if they appeared in 
my random sample. 
This Note also departed from past research’s tendency to search 
only for the exact term bear arms because, like Blackman and Phillips 
and Goldfarb, I believed that a wider and more flexible search query—
i.e., one that identified all instances of arm or arms within a certain 
range of any form of the verb bear—was necessary to capture other 
variations of the phrase that are just as relevant to determining the 
phrase’s meaning. But while this Note’s analysis expanded on past re-
search by searching for all instances of arm or arms within six words of 
bear (as opposed to just searching for bear arms or for arm or arms 
within four words of bear) and by coding a larger sample than Black-
man and Phillips, Goldfarb deserves credit for searching COEME in 
addition to COFEA and for coding all the concordance lines his 
searches returned. Still, this Note’s methodological differences with 
past researchers constitutes a significant contribution to the literature 
on this topic. 
C.  Testing Whether the Idiom “Bear Arms” Requires the 
Preposition “Against” 
This Note also used corpus linguistics to test whether Justice Scalia 
was correct when he claimed that the phrase bear arms bore its figura-
tive meaning only when followed by the proposition against. The hy-
pothesis was simple: if a corpus search revealed instances of the idiom 
being used without against, it would undermine the majority’s conclu-
sion that the preposition was always required. 
VI.  RESULTS 
This Note’s corpus data revealed that while both the majority and 
main dissenting opinions in Heller purported to rely on the original 
understanding of the Second Amendment, they each made erroneous 
historical linguistic claims. Because the Supreme Court only consid-
ered a limited number of sources before making broad generalizations 
about the historical meaning of bear arms, neither camp accurately 
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portrayed the complex and nuanced reality of how the phrase was used 
at the time the Second Amendment was ratified. 
While several scholars have begun applying corpus linguistics to 
the debate over the original meaning of the Second Amendment, this 
Note’s most novel contribution is its evidence that the Second Amend-
ment protects both a right of the people to “keep arms” and a separate 
right to “bear arms.” Furthermore, while the specialized sense of bear 
arms (i.e., serving in the military or engaging in collective armed con-
flict) appears to have been used significantly more often than the car-
rying sense of bear arms, the latter still appears to have been used more 
often than past research may have suggested. Finally, the data confirm 
past research suggesting that Justice Scalia was wrong when he asserted 
that the more “idiomatic” sense of bear arms bore this meaning only 
when followed by the preposition against. 
A.  “Keep and Bear Arms” Was Likely Not a Legal Term of Art or 
“Unitary Right” at the Time of the Founding. 
After analyzing the Second Amendment’s prefatory clause and de-
termining that the “people” referenced in the operative clause is lim-
ited to those serving in the state militia, Justice Stevens asserted that 
the Second Amendment’s protection of the right of the people to “keep 
and bear arms” protects a “single right” (or “a duty and a right”) “to 
have arms available and ready for military service, and to use them for 
military purposes when necessary.”108 But corpus linguistics data sug-
gest just the opposite. 
A COFEA search for all instances in which any variant of keep 
(e.g., kept, keeping) appeared within six words of any variant of bear 
(e.g., bore, bearing) resulted in 105 hits. Of these, fully 80 were irrel-
evant because they discussed other senses of keep (e.g., “keep . . . as 
near the coast as possible”), bear (e.g., “bear good fruit”), or both (e.g., 
“I cannot bear to keep anything that is comfortable from you”). An-
other 19 were duplicates of the Second Amendment, its proposed and 
rejected drafts, or state equivalents (the originals were included).109  
 
 108.  Id. at 651 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 109.  Goldfarb’s concluded that all the results from his search for keep and bear arms were 
from drafts and proposals related to the Second Amendment itself. Neal Goldfarb, Corpora and 
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Of the remaining six hits, only two could plausibly be interpreted 
as contemplating a “unitary right.”110 One is Virginia’s 1788 proposal 
for the Second Amendment. The other is a newspaper article by Sam-
uel Adams, in which he claimed that Massachusetts’ Declaration of 
Rights protects “a right to keep and bear arms for the common de-
fence.” 
But in actuality, the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights provides 
that, “[t]he people have a right to keep and to bear arms for the com-
mon defence.”111 While one could place more weight on the singular 
article a in “a right,” I followed Justice Stevens’s lead and gave more 
weight to the additional “to” before “bear.”112 In any case, since the 
article the in the right of the people to keep and bear arms is just as 
singular as the article a in a right to keep and to bear arms, saying a 
definitively describes a unitary right and therefore the Second Amend-
ment enshrines a unitary right would seem to assume the conclusion. 
Three of the remaining six hits supported the idea that to keep and 
bear arms contemplates two distinct rights. Two hits were rejected 
draft versions of the Second Amendment, which protected the right 
“to keep and bear arms” but immediately exempted those “religiously 
scrupulous of bearing arms” from doing so—in other words, religious 
objectors were not exempt from both bearing and keeping arms, just 
from bearing arms. The third hit was Tennessee’s 1796 Constitution, 
which reads: “That the freemen of this State have a right to Keep and 
to bear Arms for their common defence.”113 For reasons just discussed, 
this extra to suggests that the phrase protected two separate rights. 
Simply put, the frequency data and concordance line analysis 
showed that, as Justice Scalia predicted,114 keep and bear arms as a 
complete phrase was not a common phrase at the time of the Found-
ing, let alone a legal term of art for a “unitary right.” 
 
the Second Amendment, “Keep and Bear Arms” (Part 1) (updated), LAWNLINGUISTICS (July 
29, 2019, 8:18 PM) https://lawnlinguistics.com/2019/07/29/corpora-and-the-second-amend-
ment-keep-and-bear-arms-part-1/. 
 110.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 646. 
 111.  MASS. CONST., art. 17 (emphasis added).  
 112.  See Heller, 554 U.S. at 646 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court’s discussion of these 
words treats them as two ‘phrases’—as if they read ‘to keep’ and ‘to bear.’”).  
 113.  TENN. CONST. § 26 (1796) (emphasis added). 
 114.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 591 (majority opinion). 
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B.  “Bear Arms” Was Used More Often in the Specialized Sense than 
the Literal Carrying Sense at the Time of the Founding 
While past corpus linguistics research has shown that bear arms 
was used primarily in “military” or “collective” contexts, this Note 
makes the more nuanced finding that bear arms was used more often 
in the “figurative” specialized sense than the “literal” carrying sense at 
the time of the Founding. 
A COFEA search for all the instances in which any variant of bear 
was found within six words115 of arm or arms resulted in 727 results. 
To get a simple random sample, 329 concordance lines were selected 
at random for analysis.116 Of these, 105 were either duplicates or irrel-
evant to the present inquiry (e.g., “we bore him in our arms”). Of the 
remaining 224 hits, the specialized sense of bear arms occurred an im-
pressive 147 times, or in 65.6% of the (remaining) relevant sample. 
The carrying sense, by contrast, occurred a respectable 47 times, or in 
21% of the relevant sample. I judged the remaining 30 hits (13.4% of 
the sample) too ambiguous to place in one camp or the other. 
As predicted, many instances of bear arms in the literal carrying 
sense still occurred in military contexts. For example, in a 1778 letter 
to George Washington, Alexander Hamilton proposed a regulation to 
disarm those officers and supporting staffers of the Continental Army 
that did not actually use their arms in combat: 
 
Great quantities of arms and ammunition have been destroyed, 
by being in the possession of men who do not use them in time 
of action. To prevent this, for the future, no arms, accoutre-
ments, or ammunition, is to be delivered to those under the 
following description, viz: General and staff officers, waiters, 
waggoners, camp colour men, and all those who do not bear 
arms in time of action.117 
 
 115.  This is the widest possible search range on COFEA, and more than enough to capture 
relevant iterations of bear arms. 
 116.  This sample is large enough to achieve a 95% confidence level with a margin of error 
of ±4%.  
 117.  Letter from Alexander Hamilton to George Washington (before Jan. 29, 1778), 
NAT’L ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamil-
ton/01-01-02-0353 (last visited Oct. 24, 2019) (emphasis added). 
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This was not an isolated instance; many sources discussed those 
“able to bear arms” as a subset of the militia, indicating that not all 
those who served in the militia were considered to be “bearing arms”: 
 
• I prevailed upon the Baron to permit their return, both be-
cause several of the boys had been and might be enlisted 
for the war, and serve very well for music till they grow big 
enough to bear arms; and because we wanted them for the 
purpose of guarding stores here, in the room of better men 
who might be sent to the army.118 
• [I]t is strongly and earnestly enjoined, upon the command-
ing officers of corps to make all their men who are able to 
bear arms (except the necessary guards) march in the ranks 
. . . .119 
 
Other notable examples of the carrying sense being used in mili-
tary contexts are those letters, statutes, and general orders that spoke 
of bearing arms as a subset of militia duties: 
 
• They received from the enemy bounty money, pay, clothing 
and subsistence, bore arms, did guard duty, and often were 
in action against us.120 
• That in case any person liable to appear and bear arms at 
muster as aforesaid, shall neglect or refuse to appear com-
pletely armed and furnished as aforesaid . . . shall forfeit 
and pay a sum not exceeding twenty shillings . . . .121  
 
 118.  Letter from William Davies to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 21, 1781), NAT’L ARCHIVES: 
FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-05-02-0260 (last 
visited Oct. 24, 2019) (emphasis added). 
 119.  Letter from George Washington on General Orders (Aug. 23, 1777), NAT’L 
ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-11-
02-0047 (last visited Oct. 24, 2019) (emphasis added).  
 120.  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Philip Turpin (July 29, 1783), NAT’L ARCHIVES: 
FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-06-02-0260 (last 
visited Oct. 24, 2019) (emphasis added). 
 121.  Georgia Acts and Resolutions 1735-1786 (emphasis added). 
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• [A]ll male persons from sixteen years of age to sixty, to 
train . . . shall bear arms, and duly attend all musters, and 
military exercises, of the respective troops and companies 
where they are listed or belong . . . .122 
 
It is possible but awkward to say that men must show up for mus-
ters and serve in the militia—after all, wouldn’t showing up for musters 
and military exercises be part of “serving in the militia”? And it seems 
even more redundant to say that men should serve in the militia and 
participate in the militia’s activities. But it is eminently reasonable to 
clarify that men should appear with their weapons to participate in mil-
itary exercises, or carry weapons while participating in military exer-
cises. After all, Georgia actually fined those who reported for duty 
without being “completely armed and furnished.”123 
Goldfarb argues that: 
 
Although militia service involved physically carrying weapons, 
that wasn’t all that it involved. There were other obligations as 
well, such as attending musters; providing one’s own firearm, 
powder, and ammunition; and most importantly, fighting, as 
needed, in military actions. It seems more likely to me that 
when bear arms was used in connection with the duty to bear 
arms, it was intended and understood to denote the whole con-
stellation of activities comprising bearing arms, and not just 
the action of carrying weapons.124 
 
But this hardly resolves the redundancy problem highlighted 
above—if bear arms denoted “the whole constellation” of the militia’s 
activities, why was it necessary to say that men should bear arms and 
participate in those other activities? One possible answer is that these 
 
 122.  New Hampshire Temporary Law, Acts and Laws 1759-1776 (emphasis added). 
 123.  See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
 124.  Neal Goldfarb, Corpora and the Second Amendment, “Bear Arms” (Part 3) 
[UPDATED], LAWNLINGUISTICS (July 10, 2019, 3:38 PM), https://lawnlinguistics.com/ 
2019/07/10/ corpora-and-the-second-amendment-bear-arms-part-3/. 
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sources were simply using “and” in the exemplary rather than the con-
junctive sense (e.g., “John should be a good boy and do his home-
work.”). But that cannot be the whole answer because there are sources 
explicitly distinguishing between bearing arms and other militia activ-
ities.125 
Unsurprisingly, the literal carrying sense of bear arms was also 
used in individual and civilian contexts: 
 
• A soldier . . . sold an old rusty musket to a countryman for 
three dollars, who brought vegetables to market. This 
could be no crime in the market-man, who had an un-
doubted right to purchase, and bear arms.126 
• I fervently hoped that no new exigence would occur, com-
pelling me to use the arms that I bore in my own defence.127 
 
Of course, by definition, examples of the specialized sense of bear 
arms were limited to instances of military service or combat. They 
were also almost exclusively limited to “collective” contexts.128  
In sum, this preliminary corpus data raises doubts about whether 
one can dismiss the Heller Court’s adoption of the literal reading of 
bear arms (even if it ultimately only makes up 21% of this Note’s sam-
ple). As discussed in Part VI, ideally additional corpus linguistics re-
search and other tools of constitutional interpretation will be used to 
 
 125.  See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Philip Turpin (July 29, 1783), NAT’L 
ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS ONLINE,  https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-06-02-
0260 (last visited Oct. 24, 2019) (“They received from the enemy bounty money, pay, clothing 
and subsistence, bore arms, did guard duty, and often were in action against us.”) (emphasis 
added). 
 126.  JOHN TRUMBALL, M’FINGAL: A MODERN EPIC POEM, IN FOUR CANTOS 114 n.37 
(1839). Relatedly, this also suggests the “right to bear arms” means the “right to carry weapons.” 
 127.  CHARLES BROCKDEN BROWN, EDGAR HUNTLY; OR, MEMOIRS OF A 
SLEEPWALKER 180 (1799). 
 128.  But see Letter to George Washington from Benjamin Neilly (Apr. 22, 1781), NAT’L 
ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov /?q=%20Author%3A%22Neilly 
%2C%20Benjamin%22&s=1111311121&r=1 (last visited Oct. 25, 2019) (“I therefore find my-
self under the disagreeable Necessity of applying to your Excellency in support of an Injured and 
traduced reputation; and while I have the Honor of bearing Arms in defence of my own Rights, 
and that of my fellow Creatures, I hope I shall not be allowed to remain long under the imputa-
tion of Arrogant and wanton Columny. . . .”) (emphasis added). 
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shed further light on the original understanding of the right to keep 
and bear arms. 
C.  The Specialized Sense of “Bear Arms” Did Not Require the 
Preposition “Against” 
Contrary to Justice Scalia’s assertion that bear arms “unequivocally 
bore [its] idiomatic meaning only when followed by the preposition 
‘against,’”129 only 36 hits, or 24.5% of all 147 specialized sense hits in 
the sample, used the preposition against. So, not only did this “idiom” 
appear without the preposition against, but the specialized sense of 
bear arms was three times more likely to be recorded without it. While 
Justice Scalia’s other claims and ultimate conclusion regarding the Sec-
ond Amendment may still be correct (or at least subject to further re-
search and debate), it is emphatically not true that the preposition 
against was necessary to convey the specialized sense of bear arms at 
the time of the Founding. 
VII.  CAVEATS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
The research laid out in Part V supports the conclusion that by far 
the most commonly recorded use of bear arms at the time of the 
Founding was the specialized sense of serving in the military or engag-
ing in combat. This comports with Goldfarb’s research using the same 
framework and is arguably consistent with the conclusions of other 
scholars suggesting that the Second Amendment’s guarantee of a right 
to “bear arms” is limited to military service. But this Note’s research 
also reveals that over one-fifth of recorded uses of bear arms in 
COFEA employed the phrase in the carrying sense. While the literal 
carrying sense should still be recognized as a minority sense, it is not 
an all-but-nonexistent sense like Goldfarb and others suggest. In fact, 
the percentage of bear arms uses that invoke the literal sense may ac-
tually be larger.130 
All these findings should be taken together with the following ca-
veats: 
 
 129.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 586 (2008). 
 130.  As I will explain, it is also possible (but less likely) that the number might be smaller. 
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A.  Methodological Issues 
1.  Coding religious objectors 
One potential problem with this Note’s coding is that many of the 
references to bear arms—22.8% of the relevant sample—were used in 
discussions about religious groups (Quakers, Jews, and early Chris-
tians) that were morally opposed to “bearing arms.” In over 75% of 
these instances, bear arms still seemed to clearly refer to the specialized 
sense, and these lines were coded as such. However, in nearly 20% of 
the concordance lines in this subset, the phrase seemed to refer to re-
ligious opposition to carrying weapons in addition to mustering or en-
gaging in military activities. These instances, some of which are pro-
vided below, were coded as carrying sense iterations: 
 
• Do you maintain a faithful Testimony against Oaths, an 
hireling Ministry, bearing Arms, Training, or Military Ser-
vices, being concerned in any fraudulent or clandestine 
Trade[?]131 
• Whereas there are in divers Parts of this Province several of 
the People called Quakers . . . and from a religious Princi-
ple, are conseientiously [sic] scrupulous of bearing Arms, 
or appearing or answering to their Names in Muster 
Fields. . . .132 
• [T]he Jews, being tied up by the religion, laws, and consti-
tutions of their country, not to bear arms, travel, or so 
much as provide themselves necessaries for life, upon the 
day of their sabbath, are thereby rendered incapable of at-
tending the duties and services of the war. . . .133 
 
 131.  PHILADELPHIA YEARLY MEETING OF THE RELIGIOUS SOCIETY OF FRIENDS, 
RULES OF DISCIPLINE AND CHRISTIAN ADVICES OF THE YEARLY MEETING OF FRIENDS FOR 
PENNSYLVANIA AND NEW JERSEY, FIRST HELD AT BURLINGTON IN THE YEAR 1681, AND 
FROM 1685 TO 1760, INCLUSIVE, ALTERNATELY IN BURLINGTON AND PHILADELPHIA: AND 
SINCE AT PHILADELPHIA. : ALPHABETICALLY DIGESTED AND PRINTED BY DIRECTION OF THE 
SAID MEETING 110 (1797) (emphasis added). 
 132.  Laws of North Carolina (1770) (emphasis added).  
 133.  THOMAS BRADSHAW, THE WHOLE GENUINE AND COMPLETE WORKS OF 
FLAVIUS JOSEPHUS, THE LEADER AND AUTHENTIC JEWISH HISTORIAN AND CELEBRATED 
WARRIOR (1792) (emphasis added). 
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• Celsus . . . had charged the christians with refusing to bear 
arms, and to enter into military employment.134 
 
In short, depending on what historical research reveals about the 
relevant beliefs and practices of Quakers, Jews, and early Christians, 
the composition of the sample might change substantially. True, I only 
coded two concordance lines respecting religious objectors as “un-
clear,” so tipping both of these to the carrying sense column would 
only increase that sense’s share of the sample to 21.9%. But if historical 
research demonstrated that all bear arms references involving religious 
objectors should be coded as carrying instances, the relevant sample’s 
share of specialized to carrying would be a much closer 48.2% to 
39.3%.135 
The Heller dissenters argued, not unreasonably, that religious ex-
emptions supported a specialized sense reading of bear arms.136 But as 
the Heller majority countered, surely these exemptions were not 
meant “to exempt from military service those who objected to going 
to war but had no scruples about personal gunfights.”137 
2.  Coding those capable, able, and fit to bear arms 
This Note also struggled with the question of what exactly was 
meant by phrases such as able to bear arms, capable of bearing arms, 
and big or fit enough to bear arms. These phrases, which can plausibly 
 
 134.  ANTHONY BENEZET, SERIOUS CONSIDERATIONS ON SEVERAL IMPORTANT 
SUBJECTS; VIZ. ON WAR AND ITS INCONSISTENCY WITH THE GOSPEL. OBSERVATIONS ON 
SLAVERY. AND REMARKS ON THE NATURE AND BAD EFFECTS OF SPIRITUOUS LIQUORS 
(1778) (emphasis added). Admittedly, it is possible that the use of and in this line was not con-
junctive. 
 135.  Admittedly, this is extremely unlikely—not just because it seems more likely that re-
ligious objectors were opposed to war rather than the carrying of weapons, but because even if 
these objectors’ beliefs did include an aversion to carrying weapons, believers and nonbelievers 
alike could still have been referring only to the objectors’ opposition to military service. Still, this 
is an interesting question that could flip a non-trivial number of less clear-cut specialized sense 
uses to carrying sense uses (and vice versa). 
 136.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 660–61 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
Goldfarb also argues that religious exemptions point toward a non-literal reading of bear arms. 
Goldfarb, supra note 124. 
 137.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 590. I acknowledge that this might be one instance in which it 
matters whether bear arms is interpreted to mean carry weapons in case of confrontation rather 
than carry weapons. 
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refer either to individuals’ ability or eligibility to serve in the military 
or their ability to carry (and possibly handle) weapons, occurred 51 
times, making up 22.8% of the entire relevant bear arms sample. Of 
those, 20 hits (39.2%) were coded as specialized sense uses, 8 hits 
(15.7%) were coded as carrying sense uses, and a significant 23 hits 
(45.1%) were deemed too ambiguous to code. 
As in the case of the religious objectors, there were some examples 
that seemed to invoke the specialized (military service) sense: 
 
• The established rule of computing the number of men, ca-
pable of bearing arms in any nation, is by taking a fifth part 
of the whole people.138 
• What is the number of men in America able to bear arms, 
or of disciplined militia?139 
 
In other instances, the texts describing those able/capable/fit to 
bear arms seemed to use the carrying sense. I made this inference 
whenever the specialized sense would have created a redundancy (such 
as when texts referred to those able to bear arms as a subset of a military 
unit), or when texts went on to emphasize that those unable to bear 
arms were also unable to endure the rigors of military service: 
 
• [I]t is strongly and earnestly enjoined, upon the command-
ing officers of corps to make all their men who are able to 
bear arms (except the necessary guards) march in the 
ranks. . . .140 
• Next to these, the body of warriors, which comprehends all 
that are able to bear arms, hold their rank.141 
 
 138.  ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE FARMER REFUTED: OR, A MORE IMPARTIAL AND 
COMPREHENSIVE VIEW OF THE DISPUTE BETWEEN GREAT-BRITAIN AND THE COLONIES, 
INTENDED AS A FURTHER VINDICATION OF THE CONGRESS 72 (1775). 
 139.  THE HISTORY OF THE WAR IN AMERICA, BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND HER 
COLONIES (1779) (emphasis added). 
 140.  General Orders (Aug. 23, 1777), NAT’L ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS ONLINE, 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-11-02-0047 (last visited Oct. 25, 
2019) (emphasis added). 
 141.  JONATHAN CARVER, TRAVELS THROUGH THE INTERIOR PARTS OF NORTH-
AMERICA, IN THE YEARS 1766, 1767, AND 1768 260 (1778). 
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• Neither Negroes (being Slaves) old Men, or Boys, unable to 
bear Arms, & to endure the fatigues of the Campaign, nor 
Persons labouring under any bodily infirmity whatsoever 
are to be allowed to pass Muster, of which you are to take 
due Notice.142 
• [T]o protect, or to avenge women, orphans, and ecclesias-
tics, who could not bear arms in their own defence . . . .143 
 
Some may disagree with these categorizations, as Neal Goldfarb 
has,144 but it is difficult to code phrases like able/capable/fit to bear 
arms because they may very well represent a separate, second special-
ized sense of bear arms (or what the Court might call a separate bear 
arms idiom)—a shorthand for people of a certain age and physicality.145  
If that is true, it is somewhat nonsensical to try to categorize able/ca-
pable/fit to bear arms phrases within this Note’s specialized sense ver-
sus carrying sense framework (at least if we limit the specialized sense 
to mean only those serving in the military or waging war). In the end, 
I deemed many of these hits (45.1%) too ambiguous to code. More 
research is needed to determine whether these phrases tell us anything 
at all about the frequency with which Founding Era Americans used 
bear arms in the literal sense. 
 
 142.  Commission to Robert Breck (Jan. 24, 1776), NAT’L ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS 
ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-03-02-0126 (last visited 
Oct. 25, 2019). 
 143.  WILLIAM ROBERTSON, THE HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE FIFTH, 
EMPEROR OF GERMANY 60 (1771) (emphasis added). 
 144.  See Goldfarb, supra note 124 (“[T]he relevance of the military context is that it makes 
it likely that bear arms was used (and understood) to convey the idiomatic military meaning that 
the majority in Heller rejected. The salient issue in these examples was the overall ability of peo-
ple to perform military service, not merely their ability to carry weapons (for whatever purpose). 
And that would presumably have been reflected in the meaning that the authors meant to convey 
and that readers understood.”). 
 145.  Goldfarb argues this would also point to an idiomatic military sense of bear arms: 
“Whereas the duty to serve in the militia applied only to those above a given age, I haven’t seen 
any indication that there were any minimum age requirements for being allowed to carry weap-
ons. On the contrary, it appears that children learned to use firearms at a young age, and the fact 
that males were required to do militia service starting in their teenage years suggests that by that 
stage in life, they already knew how to use weapons. Unless I’m mistaken about the history, there-
fore, bear arms as used in [“big enough to bear arms” or “of age to bear arms”] meant ‘perform 
military service’ or ‘act as a warrior.’” Id. 
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Once again, this determination could change the results of Part V 
rather dramatically. If it were determined that all instances of able/ca-
pable/fit to bear arms currently coded as ambiguous would be better 
assigned to the carrying sense category, the carrying sense use of bear 
arms would increase its share of the relevant sample from 21% to 
31.3%. And if it were determined that all instances of able/capable/fit 
to bear arms currently coded as examples of the specialized sense were 
also better assigned to the carrying sense category, the specialized 
sense to carrying sense breakdown of the original relevant sample 
would go from a decisive 65.6% to 21% to a muddled 56.7% to 
40.2%.146 
3.  The specialized sense versus carrying sense framework generally, 
and “keep arms” as a clue 
This last observation segues into the most important caveat of all—
the proposed specialized sense versus carrying sense framework, while 
perhaps better suited to testing the Heller Court’s claims than the mil-
itary sense versus nonmilitary sense framework or the collective sense 
versus individual sense framework, may still be incomplete and in need 
of refinement. It is not entirely clear that the specialized sense of bear 
arms is all that separated from the carrying sense of bear arms.147 For 
example, in most instances, when Founding Era Americans served in 
the military or went to war, they not only “bore arms” in the sense that 
they served in the military or waged war—they also “bore arms” in the 
sense that they carried weapons. So, in theory, even the most “literal” 
use of bear arms—not just the able/capable/fit to bear arms use—could 
 
 146.  It is more likely that all instances of able/capable/fit to bear arms were used in the 
carrying sense than it is that all instances of religious objectors refusing to bear arms were used 
in the carrying sense. Many of those able/capable/fit to bear arms concordance lines ultimately 
categorized as examples of the specialized or carrying senses were not obviously at home in those 
buckets. Of course, this also means that the specialized sense to carrying sense breakdown might 
be even more starkly in favor of the specialized sense (79.5% to 17.4% if all able/capable/fit to 
bear arms uses currently categorized as examples of “carrying” or “unclear” were recategorized 
as “specialized”). 
 147.  See Goldfarb, supra note 85 (“Earlier in this post, when talking about the sense of 
bear arms as meaning ‘carry weapons,’ I used a hedge when I referred to that sense as ‘what would 
generally be thought of as its literal sense.’ I did that partly because the distinction between ‘lit-
eral’ and ‘figurative’ language is more complicated than you might think, but more importantly 
because the distinction is especially problematic in the case of bear arms.”).  
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be indistinguishable from the so-called idiomatic (or rather “less lit-
eral”) use of bear arms. At least, there may not be enough context for 
modern-day linguists to determine exactly which sense was being used 
in military-related documents. 
If this is true, the literal carrying of weapons may have been fre-
quently—perhaps even overwhelmingly—lost as a subset of the spe-
cialized or “idiomatic” sense of bear arms. This idea is consistent with 
Justice Scalia’s theory that the prefatory clause of the Second Amend-
ment simply announced the main impetus or purpose behind the pro-
vision; that is, the clause merely expressed the most prototypical exer-
cise of the broader individual right to own and carry weapons.148 In 
short, the right guaranteed by the Second Amendment may actually be 
more expansive (i.e. individual) than the research in Part V suggests. 
Because the carrying sense of bear arms was still common at the 
time of the Founding (and the aforementioned caveats suggest that it 
may have been even more common than this Note’s principal findings 
suggest), the Court may need to continue to rely on other textual and 
historical tools (such as the grammar cannon,149 states’ Second Amend-
ment equivalents, early American firearm regulations and practices, 
the Second Amendment’s connection to the English Bill of Rights, 
etc.) to determine the original understanding and current legal scope 
of the Second Amendment. Corpus linguistics data are most reliable 
when they are harmonized with other tools of interpretation.150 
In the case of the Second Amendment, a syntactic analysis con-
firmed by additional corpus linguistics research could do much to re-
solve the question in favor of an individual rights interpretation. Spe-
cifically, since it is clear that to keep and bear arms was not a term of 
art, much could be gleaned from a corpus linguistics analysis on the 
right to “keep arms.” No one has yet suggested that keep arms has (or 
 
 148.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 577–78 (2008). 
 149.  See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 140 (2012) (“Words are to be given the meaning that 
proper grammar and usage would assign them.”). 
 150.  Professor Larry Solum has argued that we may only be “reasonably confident that we 
have recovered the original public meaning of the constitutional text” through a sort of “trian-
gulation” of corpus linguistics, immersion in the conceptual and linguistic world of the members 
of the Founding Era, and a study of the constitutional record. Lawrence B. Solum, Triangulating 
Public Meaning: Corpus Linguistics, Immersion, and the Constitutional Record, 2017 BYU L. 
REV. 1621, 1681–82. 
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had) an “idiomatic meaning” quite like bear arms did and does—alt-
hough Neal Goldfarb has made some interesting findings regarding 
how keep in general may have idiomaticity.151 For now, however, it 
seems likely that keeping arms simply described the private possession 
(and possibly maintenance) of weapons. Confirmation that keep arms 
was used more “literally” in the Founding Era would strongly imply 
that bear arms was also meant to be taken more “literally” (i.e. in the 
carrying sense) in the context of the Second Amendment, where it ap-
pears in conjunction with keep. As Justice Scalia noted, the phrase keep 
and bear arms would be extremely incoherent if keep arms were inter-
preted literally and bear arms were interpreted figuratively: “The word 
‘Arms’ would have two different meanings at once: ‘weapons’ (as the 
object of ‘keep’) and (as the object of ‘bear’) one-half of an idiom. It 
would be rather like saying ‘He filled and kicked the bucket’ to mean 
‘He filled the bucket and died.’ Grotesque.”152 It is hard to imagine this 
“one-half of an idiom” reading surviving if keep arms were confirmed 
to be purely literal.153 
4.  Limitations of COFEA 
The database itself also has limitations. First, it would be beneficial 
to confirm this Note’s research with another corpus, such as COEME. 
As previously noted, Neal Goldfarb has already performed such a 
search. However, that search only looked for iterations of arms within 
four words of any form of the word bear—and technology currently 
allows us to search up to six words on either side of a word. He also 
eliminated any concordance lines with language that tracked too 
 
 151.  Neal Goldfarb, Corpora and the Second Amendment: “Keep” (Part 2), 
LAWNLINGUISTICS (Oct. 21, 2018), https://lawnlinguistics.com/2018/10/21/corpora-and-the-
second- amendment-keep-part-2/. 
 152.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 587. 
 153.  For an argument that it is possible to have arms be idiomatic for bear arms but literal 
for keep arms in to keep and bear arms, see Goldfarb, supra note 109; Neal Goldfarb, Corpora 
and the Second Amendment: “Keep and Bear Arms” (Part 2), LAWNLINGUISTICS (Aug. 23, 
2019, 10:01 PM) https://lawnlinguistics.com/2019/08/23/corpora-and-the-second-amendment-
part-2/ (“The uses of bear arms that I’ve discussed provide evidence supporting the conclusion 
that the phrase could have been used idiomatically in the Second Amendment, even though that 
would entail that arms mean two things at once.”). 
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closely to the Second Amendment. For reasons given earlier, I disagree 
with that decision. 
Second, COFEA is itself a moving target—you cannot rely on your 
data for too long. COFEA is constantly growing as BYU adds docu-
ments in an effort to make the corpus more representative. This means 
that the searches I did when I started this Note at the end of 2018 will 
not be as comprehensive as the searches I can do when this Note is 
published. COFEA is also imperfect because it largely represents the 
language of elite white males,154 and lacks sources from Founding Era 
newspapers and the state ratification debates.155 
5.  Author bias 
The last caveat I would add is that this Note’s concordance line 
coding was obviously the product of my own intuition and biases. Ide-
ally, coding decisions are reviewed by multiple people and decisions 
are subject to quality control.156 Again, it is precisely the replicability 
and falsifiability of corpus linguistics that makes it such a refreshingly 
transparent enterprise. 
B.  Areas for Further Research 
1.  The right of the people 
There is also much to be gained from supplemental corpus linguis-
tics research on the phrase the right of the people,157 as the main Heller 
opinions disagreed on whether the phrase was used more often to refer 
to individual rights or collective rights.158 
 
 154. See Lee & Phillips, supra note 34, at 294–95. On the other hand, it was essentially all 
elite white males who were writing and ratifying the Second Amendment.  
 155. Id. at 295. The lack of newspapers, at least, is a “less serious” problem because found-
ing-era newspapers tended to be “a collection of articles, letters, essays, etc., rather than news 
articles written in a distinctive style.” Id. 
 156. See, e.g., Stephanie H. Barclay et al., Original Meaning and the Establishment Clause: 
A Corpus Linguistics Analysis, 61 ARIZ. L. REV. 505, 537 (2019). 
 157. Of course, if the specific phrase right of the people is determined not to be a term of 
art, a broader search (such as searching for all instances in which people comes within six words 
of right or rights) would be a more thorough inquiry. 
 158. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 579–81 (2008). 
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Goldfarb gives us reason to believe that the right of the people was 
most frequently used in conjunction with rights exercised as a group.159 
He argues that the people referred to in the Second Amendment 
should therefore be read as limited to those that were of the militia, 
not the people generally.160 This would contrast sharply with our cur-
rent understanding of the people in the Fourth Amendment, which has 
been interpreted to protect individual rights.161 
Professor Akhil Reed Amar also argues that the people in the Sec-
ond Amendment should be synonymous with militia, focusing on an 
early draft of the Second Amendment’s reference to “a well regulated 
militia, composed of the body of the people.”162 But saying the militia 
 
 159. See Goldfarb, supra note 91. 
 160. Neal Goldfarb, Corpora and the Second Amendment, “The Right (of the People) 
to . . . Bear Arms”, LAWNLINGUISTICS (July 16, 2019, 2:54PM), https://lawnlinguis-
tics.com/2019/07/16/ corpora-and-the-second-amendment-the-right-of-the-people-to-bear-
arms/. 
 161. But see Amar, supra note 14 (“The rest of the Bill of Rights confirms this communi-
tarian reading. The core of the First Amendment’s assembly clause, which textually abuts the 
Second Amendment, is the right of ‘the people’—in essence, voters—to ‘assemble’ in constitu-
tional conventions and other political conclaves. So, too, the core rights retained and reserved to 
‘the people’ in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments were rights of the people collectively to govern 
themselves democratically. The Fourth Amendment is trickier: ‘The right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated.’ Here, the collective ‘people’ wording is paired with more individualistic 
language of ‘persons.’ And these words obviously focus on the private domain, protecting indi-
viduals in their private homes more than in the public square. Why, then, did the Fourth use the 
words ‘the people’ at all? Probably to highlight the role that jurors—acting collectively and rep-
resenting the electorate—would play in deciding which searches were reasonable and how much 
to punish government officials who searched or seized improperly. An early draft of James Mad-
ison’s amendment protecting jury rights helps make this linkage obvious and also resonates with 
the language of the Second Amendment: ‘[T]he trial by jury, as one of the best securities to the 
rights of the people, ought to remain inviolate.’ Note the obvious echoes here—‘security’ (Second 
Amendment), ‘secure’ (Fourth Amendment), and ‘securities’ (draft amendment); ‘shall not be in-
fringed,’ ‘shall not be violated,’ and ‘ought to remain inviolate’; and, of course, ‘the right of the 
people’ in all three places.”). 
 162. See Akhil Reed Amar, Heller, HLR, and Holistic Legal Reasoning, 146 HARV. L. REV. 
145, 166 (2008) (“[T]he otherwise stilted syntax of the Amendment, with its reference to the 
‘militia’ in the opening and the ‘people’ in the closing, makes the most sense and becomes the 
least stilted when we read these two key nouns, ‘militia’ and ‘people,’ as synonyms. Here is the 
key linkage between the Amendment’s two parts. In eighteenth-century republican ideology, the 
(general) militia were the people. Indeed, an earlier version of the Amendment made this implicit 
syntactical equation textually explicit by referring to ‘a well regulated militia, composed of the 
body of the people.’ Although this extra verbiage clarified the Amendment’s substance, it clunked 
up the style of an already grammatically complicated sentence and eventually got dropped. Even 
so, the equation of the militia with the people is implicit in the very syntax and flow of the final 
Amendment as a whole when read against its background of eighteenth century republican ide-
ology.”). 
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is composed of “the body of the people” seems to suggest that the mi-
litia is a subset or part of “the people,” not synonymous with “the peo-
ple.” In other words, the Second Amendment could simply be explain-
ing that since the militia (a subset of the people) is necessary to the 
security of a free state, the right of the people (more generally) to have 
and carry weapons shall not be infringed. 
If research shows that the people of the Second Amendment are 
the same as the people in the Fourth Amendment, then it seems much 
more likely that the Second Amendment protects an individual right 
to own and carry weapons, just as the Fourth Amendment protects an 
individual right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures. Of 
course, it is theoretically possible to protect an individual right to serve 
in the militia, but it is unclear if this would have been considered a 
preexisting, negative, natural right at the time of the Founding, let 
alone one deemed worthy of inclusion in the Bill of Rights. 
2.  Keep arms 
As noted in Part V, further analysis on the phrase keep arms could 
provide insight into which sense of bear arms the Second Amendment 
employs. If keep arms is confirmed to be literal, it becomes much more 
likely that bear arms was used literally as well. 
C.  The Limitations of Corpus Linguistics 
It is important to remember that corpus linguistics is just one tool 
of constitutional interpretation. Professor Larry Solum has argued that 
corpus linguistics should be “triangulated” with an immersion in the 
texts of the relevant time period and community, as well as a deep un-
derstanding of the constitutional record.163 This seems especially pru-
dent in the Heller debate because Justice Scalia relied on many im-
portant historical claims that corpus linguistics can do very little to 
confirm or deny. If, for example, we accept that the Second Amend-
ment is simply the more expansive offspring of the English Bill of 
Rights,164 our frequency data and concordance line analysis should ar-
guably carry less weight in the calculus. 
 
 163. Solum, supra note 150, at 1681–82. 
 164.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592–95 (2008). 
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VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Much more corpus linguistics research can and should be done to 
help shed light on Heller’s linguistic claims, just as more historical re-
search can and should be done to shed light on Heller’s historical 
claims. 
For now, we can have greater confidence that (1) the Second 
Amendment protects two distinct rights; (2) at the time of the Found-
ing, the literal “carrying” sense of bear arms was somewhat common 
but not overwhelmingly so; and (3) that at the time of the Founding 
the more “idiomatic” or specialized sense of bear arms did not require 
the preposition against. Of course, these findings represent something 
of a mixed bag for both those who argue that the Second Amendment 
protects an individual right and those who argue that it protects the 
more limited right to bear arms in connection with a state militia. 
But it is better to have a mixed bag than a bag of wish fulfillment. 
If we are serious about originalism and the original ordinary meaning 
inquiry in particular, we must be willing to consider and grapple with 
all of the available data. In this day and age, that means engaging with 
the data made available through corpus linguistics. 
Josh Jones 
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